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Volume 19, Number 2, Winter 1981
Interest Analysis: The Quest for
Perfection and the Frailties of Man
David E. Seidelson
Those authors who encouraged the use of interest analysis as the
appropriate method of resolving choice-of-law problems (and I count
myself among the number)' and those courts that embraced the
methodology have since sought to offer solutions to the difficult fact
and law patterns which inevitably confronted the courts. These efforts
show the high sense of professional responsibility of the proponents of
interest analysis, both writers and judges; having invited the courts to
employ interest analysis or having accepted the invitation, they subse-
quently recognized an obligation to provide guidance and counsel when
use of the methodology became most difficult. That their suggestions
are not entirely consistent2 does not minimize either their sense of
EDITOR'S NOTE: The author is Professor of Law at The National Law Center of the
George Washington University. B.A., University of Pittsburgh (1951); LL.B., University of
Pittsburgh School of Law (1956).
1. See, e.g., Seidelson, Interest Analysis Meets the Jury Function in an Alienation
of Affections Action, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1973); Seidelson, Interest Analysis: For Those
Who Like It and Those Who Don't, 11 DuQ. L. REV. 283 (1973); Seidelson, Interest
Analysis and an Enhanced Degree of Specificity: The Wrongful Death Action, 10 DuQ. L.
REV. 525 (1972); Seidelson, Interest Analysis and Divorce Actions, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 315
(1972); Seidelson, Comment on Cipolla v. Shaposka, 9 DuQ. L. REV. 423 (1971); Seidelson,
The Americanization of Renvoi, 7 DuQ. L. REV. 201 (1969); Seidelson, The Full Faith and
Credit Clause: An Instrument for Resolution of Intranational Conflicts Problems, 32 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 554 (1964); Seidelson, Full Faith and Credit: A Modest Proposal... Or
Two, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 462 (1962).
2. See, e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 346 (2d ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as WEINTRAUB'S COMMENTARY] (apply the plaintiff-favoring local law in
tort cases; discussed at length, see text accompanying notes 16-22, 62-66 & 80-88 infra)
(Professor Weintraub's three rules for tort cases were published first in Weintraub, The
Future of Choice of Law for Torts: What Principles Should Be Preferred?, 41 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 146, 162 (1977)); Sedler, On Choice of Law and The Great Quest. A Cri-
tique of Special Multistate Solutions to Choice-of-Law Problems, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 807
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responsibility or the rationality of each suggestion. After all, hard
cases make for divergent views.
In the context of tort cases, perhaps no one has offered a more basic
and encompassing set of rules than Professor Weintraub:
1. "False conflict" cases: If, in the light of its contacts with the parties
or the transaction, only one state will have the policies underlying its tort
rule advanced, apply the law of that state.
2. "True conflict" cases: If two or more states having contacts with
the parties or the transaction will have the policies underlying their dif-
ferent tort rules advanced, apply the law that will favor the plaintiff
unless one or both of the following factors is present:
a. That law is anachronistic or aberrational.
b. The state with that law does not have sufficient contact
with the defendant or the defendant's actual or intended course
of conduct to make application of its law reasonable.
3. "No interest" cases: If none of the states having contacts with the
parties or the transaction will have the policies underlying its tort rule
advanced, apply the law that will favor the plaintiff unless one or both of
the following factors is present:
a. That law is anachronistic or aberrational.
b. The state with that law does not have sufficient contact
with the defendant or the defendant's actual or intended course
of conduct to make application of its law reasonable.'
So far as rule 1 is concerned, I think no one can take serious excep-
tion. If only one state has a local law based upon a policy which con-
verts into a signficant interest on the part of that state in applying its
law, then there is no real conflict. That state's local law clearly should
(1979Xapply the forum's local law); Twerski & Mayer, Multistate Choice-of-Law Rules:
Continuing the Colloquy With Professors Trautman and Sedler, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 843
(1979)(fashion and apply a multistate law accommodating the forum's essentially pro-
cedural concern); von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their
Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REV. 347
(1974Xfashion and apply a multistate law accommodating some portion of each state's local
law).
See also, e.g., Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64
(1972)(Fuld, C.J.)(three rules for guest statute cases; see discussion in text accompanying
note 28 infra); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215
(Sullivan, J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976)("comparative impairment"; see discussion in
text accompanying note 74 infra).
Obviously, the brief characterization I have given to each writer's or each court's sug-
gested approach does not begin to explicate the totality of each approach or its underly-
ing rationale.
The second edition of Professor Weintraub's Commentary, like the first, is a delight
to read. Professor Weintraub writes clearly, analyzes cases accurately, and states legal
conclusions precisely. Perhaps best of all, when in disagreement with existing judicial
methodology, he offers his own carefully considered alternatives. Those alternatives are
invariably stimulating and thought provoking.
3. WEINTRAUB'S COMMENTARY, supra note 2, at 346 (footnote omitted).
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be applied; it's really a "no conflict" case. Then why the characteriza-
tion "false conflict"? The answer, I think, is that, although the other
state has no significant interest in the application of its contrary local
law, it still has a minimal interest in the litigation. Upon examination,
however, it is seen that the minimal interest is best served by the ap-
plication of the first state's local law. Therefore, although the two
states have different local laws (an apparent conflict), only the first
state has a significant interest in the application of its own local law.
The second state has only a minimal interest in the litigation which is
best served by the first state's local law (a false conflict). Gaither v.
Myers4 provides an excellent illustration of the false conflict case.
The defendant left his station wagon parked and unattended, with
the keys in the tailgate, in the District of Columbia. A thief stole the
vehicle. The negligent driving of the thief caused the station wagon to
collide with an automobile in Maryland, some five miles from the
District line. The plaintiff, driver of the Maryland car, sued the defend-
ant in the District of Columbia. Both the District of Columbia and
Maryland had similar traffic code provisions which made it illegal to
leave an unattended vehicle parked without removing the keys.' More-
over, under the District's local law, one who violates that provision is
liable for injuries inflicted by the thief's negligent driving.' Under
Maryland's local law, however, the violator faces no such civil liability.'
The plaintiff, of course, asserted the applicability of the District's law
and the defendant argued that Maryland's law should apply.
There are a couple of reasons underlying the District's law. One is
to provide the collision victim of the thief's conduct with a financially
responsible defendant.' It may be that the class of plaintiffs intended
to be so protected is limited to those domiciled in the District. Since
the plaintiff in the case was domiciled in Maryland, he may have been
without the protected class, so that the first reason for the District's
law would not convert into a significant interest on the part of the
4. 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
5. D.C. Traffic and Motor Vehicle Regulations, art. XIV, § 98 (1970), states in part:
"No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended
without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition and removing the key .... Virtually
the same statutory language is found under Maryland law. MD. CODE ANN. art. 661/2, §
11-1101 (1957) (recodified and amended at MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 21-1101 (1977)).
6. See Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
7. See Liberto v. Holfeldt, 221 Md. 62, 155 A.2d 698 (1959).
8. The court in Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968), stated that, "[alside
from the purpose served ... in deterring highly hazardous motorist conduct, tort liability
also has the purpose of shifting the loss from the injured victim .. . to the vehicle
operator [or owner] who, in turn, if he chooses, may procure insurance." Id. at 223.
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District in the application of its local law.9 The second reason for that
law is conduct regulation." The District apparently believes that the
sting of liability is an efficient and legitimate means of deterring such
conduct, namely, violation of the traffic provision, in the District of
Columbia. Since the defendant's conduct occurred in the District, that
reason would seem to apply. Thus, the District had a significant in-
terest in the application of its liability-imposing law.
Maryland apparently believes that the intervening conduct of the
thief is superseding as a matter of law.1 More elaborately stated,
Maryland may view the intervening, intentionally wrongful, criminal
act of the thief (coupled with his negligent driving) as so overwhelm-
ingly culpable that it would be offensive to impose liability for the con-
sequences of that conduct on the actor who had merely neglected to
remove the key after parking his vehicle. In such a situation, Maryland
would protect the economic integrity of the neglectful parker.12 The
class of parkers probably intended to be so protected by Maryland,
however, would consist of those domiciled in Maryland. Since the de-
fendant in the case was not a Maryland domiciliary, he would not be
within the protected class."3 Consequently, Maryland would have no
9. Because of the unique historical and geographical relationship between Maryland
and the District of Columbia, Judge Leventhal apparently was willing to describe the
class of plaintiffs to be protected broadly enough to include Maryland domiciliaries:
It is true that this compensatory policy has the greatest relevance to cases
when the mishap occurs in the District and when District residents are plaintiffs.
However, to confine the benefits . . . to the territory ceded by the states of
Maryland and Virginia to form the Nation's Capital would be to shun the present
reality of the economically and socially integrated greater metropolitan area. It is a
commonplace that residents of Maryland are part of the Washington metropolitan
trading area, and that District residents and business have an interest in the well-
being of these citizens of the Free State.
10. The Gaither court noted that: "[t]he strength of the District's policy of 'discourag-
ing the hazardous conduct which the ordinance forbids' has not diminished .... On the
contrary we have never had greater need for doctrines helping to deter injuries and
crimes traceable in significant measure to keys left in unattended cars." Id at 222.
11. Concerning this aspect of Maryland law, the Gaither court explained:
For although it is an offense in Maryland to leave one's keys in an unattended
motor vehicle, the highest court of that state has ruled as a matter of law that the
intervening conduct of the thief breaks the chain of proximate cause and insulates
the offender from tort liability.
Id. at 221 (footnotes omitted).
12. The Gaither court took note of Maryland's interest in limiting the liability of a
car owner who had neglectfully parked, stating: "Maryland :.. expresses an interest in
protecting car owners from tort liability for injury caused by car thieves." Id. at 224.
13. The Gaither court, moreover, recognized the scope of Maryland's interest in pro-
tecting car owners, "that interest of Maryland in curtailing liability of a car owner, would
not seem to extend to an owner like our defendant, who is not a citizen of Maryland but
rather a resident of the District of Columbia." I&
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significant interest in the application of its defendant-protecting law.
An interest analysis court, having concluded that: (1) the District has
a significant interest in the application of its local law; and (2)
Maryland has no significant interest in the application of its contrary
law, could easily have ended its analysis at that point in order to apply
the District's law. However, an extraordinarily able jurist, like the late
Judge Leventhal, would pursue further analysis in order to demon-
strate that the wholly rational and appropriate result, namely, applica-
tion of the District's law, was also in fact an excellent result. Judge
Leventhal noted that, although Maryland had no significant interest in
the application of its defendant-protecting law, it did have a minimal
interest in the litigation because the plaintiff was a Maryland
domiciliary. Undoubtedly, that minimal interest of Maryland would
best be served by the application of the District's plaintiff-protecting
law." The court, by recognizing Maryland's minimal interest in the
litigation and the fulfillment of that minimal interest through the ap-
plication of the District's law, was therefore able to demonstrate that
the case presented a false conflict. 5 Similarly, Professor Weintraub's
rule 1 recognizes the wisdom of identifying the false conflict case and
demonstrating the achievement of the best result in such a case. Vir-
tually everyone would concur in that conclusion. However, I find ac-
quiescence in Professor Weintraub's rules 2 and 36 considerably more
difficult.
Because of my own rather strong plaintiff bias in tort actions, I find
Professor Weintraub's approach in rules 2 and 3, and the results that
approach would produce, personally pleasing.
These plaintiff-favoring rules, however, are a little bit difficult for
me to accept objectively for several reasons. First, although I think his
14. Concerning the nonapplicability of Maryland's owner-protective policy to a
nonresident, Judge Leventhal stated that, "[t]his seems especially true where it is a
Maryland citizen who is being compensated for his injuries." Id
15. Judge Leventhal cogently concluded that, under analysis, the seeming conflict
disappeared:
Thus, we are not concerned with any real "conflict" between the interests of
Maryland and the District in this case. The fact that two states have different rules
where all the factors are oriented to one state does not necessarily mean that there
is a "conflict" in which one state demands and the other rejects the application of
its rule to a situation where the pertinent factors arise in two or more states.
Where there is no such conflict of interest in a multi-state situation, as this court
and others have noted, there is a "false conflicts" situation. In such a case applica-
tion of the appropriate rule is simplified. We think the D.C. Court of Appeals was
correct in its conclusion that [defendant's] liability turns on the District of Colum-
bia's rule ....
Id (footnote omitted).
16. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
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underlying rationale is quite accurately stated: "recovery, with loss-
distribution through the tortfeasor's liability insurance, represents the
most pervasive aspect of tort developments in this country over the
past several decades,"'7 this statement, in my opinion, is essentially a
sweeping conclusion as to what constitutes the "better rule of law."'8
That local law which favors the plaintiff is the better rule of law.
Because use of the "better rule of law" as a "choice influencing factor"
has always disturbed me, 9 I am critical of Professor Weintraub's ex-
pansion of the factor to an across-the-board rule.
I am compelled to concede immediately, however, that expansion of
the factor into a general rule eliminates one (and perhaps the most
critical) of my concerns with the "better rule of law": undue judicial
parochialism.'0 Once the better rule of law is defined as that law which
is plaintiff-favoring, the forum's inclination to favor its own local law is
markedly inhibited. The forum's law would be the better law only if it
were the plaintiff-favoring law. Yet, Professor Weintraub's approach
17. WEINTRAUB'S COMMENTARY, supra note 2, at 345 (footnote omitted).
18. Professor Leflar proposed the "better rule of law" as one of several "choice-
influencing" factors. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U.L. REV. 267, 295 (1966); Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Con-
siderations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1587 (1966).
19. See, e.g., Seidelson, Interest Analysis Meets the Jury Function in an Alienation
of Affections Action, 12 DuQ. L. REV. 1, 9 n.28 (1973); Seidelson, Interest Analysis: For
Those Who Like It and Those Who Don't 11 DuQ. L. REV. 283, 307 (1973); Seidelson, Com-
ment on Cipolla v. Shaposka, 9 DuQ. L. REV. 423, 427 (1971). Professor Cavers character-
ized the use of the "better rule of law" as a "choice-influencing" factor as being a conver-
sion of the choice-of-law process into a study of "comparative jurisprudence" D. CAVERS,
THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 86 (1965).
20. Despite judicial disclaimers, use of the "better rule of law" seems to impel courts
toward the application of their own local law. See, e.g., Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563,
573, 267 A.2d 854, 859 (1970) (dissenting opinion); Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157
N.W.2d 579 (1968); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
There is at least one case in which the court recognized the other state's local law as
being the better rule of law. See Maguire v. Exeter and Hampton Elec. Co., 114 N.H. 589,
325 A.2d 778 (1974). The court, however, applied its own (presumably poorer) local law
after finding that the forum's interests were clearly superior. In Maguire the decedent, a
Maine domiciliary, sustained death-producing injuries while working in New Hampshire
for a New Hampshire employer as the result of the alleged negligence of the defendant, a
New Hampshire corporation. The decedent left only a collateral relative. In such cir-
cumstances, the New Hampshire wrongful death statute imposed a $20,000 ceiling on
recovery; the Maine wrongful death statute imposed no such ceiling. Assuming that the
surviving relative was domiciled in Maine, that state would seem to have had a significant
interest in the application of its local law, which was apparently intended to protect the
economic integrity of Maine domiciled survivors. Although New Hampshire had a signifi-
cant interest in the application of its local law, which law was apparently intended to pro-
tect the economic integrity of New Hampshire defendants, I confess I do not find New
Hampshire's interest so clearly superior as did the court.
Vol. 19:207
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defining the better rule of law for all tort cases concerns me, despite
its elimination of judicial parochialism. His approach seems to supplant
that narrowness of judicial view with a rather rigid and conclusionary
view of the better rule of law. Because of my own plaintiff bias, I can
sympathize and even identify with Professor Weintraub's rules which
would implement that bias. But I'm not sure that the plaintiff-favoring
rules reflect an adequate sensitivity to those local laws which are
defendant-favoring even in jurisdictions in which the general thrust of
tort law "over the past several decades" has been toward compen-
sating the plaintiff. If a given state generally favors compensation for
the victim, yet has particular local laws protecting the economic in-
tegrity of defendants, that state presumably has concluded that, not-
withstanding the general move toward compensation, there are situa-
tions in which a contrary view should prevail. Such a legislative or
judicial conclusion should not be implicitly characterized as an
anachronism ready for deposit in a reliquary. To do so may offend the
judicial sensibilities of the courts sitting in that state.
This potential for discrediting pro-defendant local laws, in turn, sug-
gests to me a second problem with Professor Weintraub's rules. In a
case where a state's defendant-favoring local laws would be implicitly
labelled as obsolete and relegated to some judicial attic for choice-of-
law purposes, that state may be so disinclined to recognize a set of
sweeping plaintiff-favoring conflicts rules that the rules become prac-
tically worthless. Consequently, I am inclined to think that Professor
Weintraub's rules, however accurately stated their factual rationale,"
are not adequately sensitive to a state's decision to fashion or retain a
defendant-favoring local law and may even offend a state's courts
because of the implied denigration of such a law. Finally, for reasons
which will appear shortly,22 I find it difficult to accept the "no interest"
characterization which stimulates the application of rule 3; conse-
quently, I find that rule additionally inappropriate.
Of course, it's relatively easy to label someone else's approach as
less than perfect. What's considerably more difficult is to fashion a dif-
ferent approach which, at least arguably, may be somewhat better.
What's my "magic rule"? Well, the truth is, I don't have one. I am in-
clined to think that careful, specific analysis of the particular case
before the court, complemented by existing techniques with perhaps a
slightly more ordered category of interests, may prove to be the best
manner of using interest analysis to resolve even the tough choice-of-
law problems. Perhaps the best way to compare Professor Weintraub's
21. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
22. See text accompanying notes 62-66 infra.
1981
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rules, my own suggested approach, as well as a third approach pro-
mulgated by the eminent jurist Judge Fuld,' would be to apply them
to a case which has become generally well known and generally con-
sidered as a difficult test for interest analysis.
In Neumeier v. Kuehner,24 a New York domiciliary (host driver) and
an Ontario domiciliary (guest passenger) were killed when their car col-
lided with a Canadian National Railway train in Ontario. The
automobile trip of the two occupants had begun in Ontario (at the
passenger's home) and was intended to end in Ontario (at the
passenger's home after a visit to Long Beach, Ontario). The plaintiff,
surviving widow of the deceased passenger and an Ontario domiciliary,
sued the defendant, a New York domiciliary and the personal repre-
sentative of the deceased driver's estate, and the Canadian National
Railway in New York. The estate asserted the Ontario guest statute
which immunized the host driver from liability absent gross
negligence.' The plaintiff argued that New York local law, containing
no guest statute, was applicable.
Whether one attributes Ontario's guest statute to a desire to pro-
tect Good Samaritan hosts domiciled in Ontario from ungrateful guests
or to prevent potentially collusive suits between overly friendly hosts
and guests,26 thus assuring Ontario drivers of relatively lower liability
insurance rates, Ontario would seem to have no significant interest in
the application of its local law. Since the host driver was domiciled in
New York, he was not within the class of Good Samaritans intended to
be protected by Ontario's guest statute.
Moreover, since any pay-out by the host's liability carrier would be
23. See text accompanying note 28 infra.
24. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972). For a symposium on
Neumeier, see 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1973).
25. ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 64, § 20(2) (1966).
26. The Neumeier court mentioned both policies but gave preference to that of pro-
tecting drivers:
It is worth noting, at this point, that, although our court originally considered that
the sole purpose of the Ontario statute was to protect Ontario defendants and their
insurers against collusive claims (see Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482-483,
240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749-750, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283-284). [Sic] "Further research ... has
revealed the distinct possibility that one purpose, and perhaps the only purpose, of
the statute was to protect owners and drivers against ungrateful guests." (Reese,
Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 Col. L. Rev. 548, 558; see Trautman, Two
Views on Kell v. Henderson: A Comment, 67 Col. L. Rev. 465, 469.)
31 N.Y.2d 121, 124, 286 N.E.2d 454, 455, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 67 (1972) (citations in original). In
support of the view that the Ontario guest statute was intended to protect against col-
lusive claims, see Baade, The Case of the Disinterested Two States: Neumeier v.
Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 150, 152 (1973).
Vol. 19:207
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charged to its New York business dealings, there would be no risk of
higher premium rates for Ontario drivers.
New York's local law permitting a passenger to recover from a host
on a finding of simple negligence presumably exists for the purpose of
protecting the economic integrity of New York domiciled passengers
by assuring them of the opportunity to recover from negligent hosts.
This further ensures that such passengers will not become indigent
wards of New York.' Since the deceased passenger was domiciled in
Ontario, that reason for New York's local law would not convert into a
significant interest in the application of New York law. Consequently,
neither Ontario nor New York had a significant interest in the applica-
tion of its own local law. That negative stand-off is what made the case
difficult.
The difficulty presented by Neumeier provided Judge Fuld with the
opportunity to proffer his three rules for resolving all choice-of-law
problems related to guest statutes:
1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled
in the same state, and the car is there registered, the law of that
state should control and determine the standard of care which the
host owes to his guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his
domicile and that state does not cast him in liability for that con-
duct, he should not be held liable by reason of the fact that liabil-
ity would be imposed upon him under the tort law of the state of
the victim's domicile. Conversely, when the guest was injured in
the state of his own domicile and its law permits recovery, the
driver who has come into that state should not-in the absence of
special circumstances-be permitted to interpose the law of his
state as a defense.
3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are
domiciled in different states, the rule is necessarily less
27. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d at 126, 286 N.E.2d at 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 68 ("It
is clear that . . .New York has a deep interest in protecting its own [passenger]
residents").
See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), where
the court stated:
New York's policy of requiring a tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries
caused by his negligence cannot be doubted-as attested by the fact that the
Legislature of this State has repeatedly refused to enact a statute denying or
limiting recovery in such cases ... and our courts have neither reason nor warrant
for departing from that policy simply because the accident, solely affecting New
York residents and arising out of the operation of a New York based automobile,
happened beyond its borders.
Id. at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750 (citations omitted).
1981
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categorical. Normally, the applicable rule of decision will be that
of the state where the accident occurred but not if it can be
shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will advance
the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the
smooth working of the multi-state system or producing great
uncertainty for litigants. 8
Judge Fuld found rule 3 to be applicable and discovered no justifiable
reason for displacing lex loci delicti. As a result, Ontario's guest
statute was applied.
What led Judge Fuld to fashion those three rules for the guidance of
his and other courts confronted with guest statute choice-of-law prob-
lems? I think it's fair to infer that there were two major reasons.'
First, the guest statute cases decided by the New York Court of Ap-
peals from Babcock v. Jackson" through Tooker v. Lopez 1 and the
"bad press" those decisions had received in some quarters3 2 probably
28. Neumeier v. Keuhner, 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
Chief Judge Fuld had first proposed the three rules in his concurring opinion in Tooker v.
Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 585, 249 N.E.2d 394, 404, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 532 (1969).
29. For a discussion of the second reason, see text accompanyingnotes 49-52 infra.
30. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
31. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
32. See, e.g., Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969), where the
court stated:
Our misgivings [about departing from lex loci delicti] commence with the lead-
ing case cited Babcock v. Jackson ....
It would lengthen this opinion unnecessarily to analyze all of the opinions which,
since Babcock v. Jackson, have wrestled with the precepts thereof. Nonetheless,
the prudence of stare decisis kept always in mind, the record of some of the dilem-
mas created by the Babcock-Jackson rule will serve to explain our wary abstinence.
Id. at 517-20, 170 N.W.2d at 139-41.
The court in White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966), also abstained from
adopting the Babcock line of cases:
In several of the jurisdictions which have discarded lex loci delicti, the rule
which is to take its place seems still in the process of development. See Dym v.
Gordon .... It is characteristic of our legal system that the emergence of a new
doctrine depends for its clarification on case-to-case decisions, as its application to
different factual situations presents new difficulties to be resolved and new factors
to be weighed .... [U]nless and until what we deem a sound, practical alternative
is evolved, we believe that any change should be made by the Legislature rather
than by the courts.
Id. at 355, 223 A.2d at 767.
In Friday v. Smoot, 58 Del. 488, 211 A.2d 594 (1965), the court pre-echoed most of the
negative sentiments concerning the Babcock rule:
The new rule is exemplified by such cases as Babcock v. Jackson ....
The new test requires a court to determine which state has the more significant
relationship with the tort and the parties, and to apply the substantive law of that
Vol. 19:207
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formed a principal reason. In Babcock, Judge Fuld rejected lex loci
delicti as the one and only conflicts rule for tort cases and embraced a
form of interest analysis. Finding the prevention of collusive suits to
be the reason for Ontario's guest statute,' and noting that the defend-
ant host driver was a New York domiciliary driving a New York
registered car when the car collided with a stone wall in OntarioMu
Judge Fuld concluded that Ontario had no significant interest in the
application of its local law. Since the plaintiff passenger was also a
New York domiciliary, New York did have a significant interest in the
application of its local law which was intended to protect the economic
integrity of New York domiciled passengers.' Consequently, New
York's local law was applied and Ontario's guest statute rejected.
Dym v. Gordon6 followed. Again, both plaintiff passenger and de-
fendant host were New York domiciliaries, and the collision occurred
in a jurisdiction (Colorado) having a guest statute.3 7 Dym was factually
distinguishable from Babcock in at least two respects: (1) the New
York car collided with another vehicle (operated by a Kansas
domiciliary); and (2) the host-guest relationship had been entered into
in Colorado where the New York domiciliaries were attending classes.
Judge Burke found those factual distinctions to be legally significant.
He concluded that there were three reasons underlying the Colorado
guest statute: (1) "the protection of Colorado drivers and their in-
surance carriers against fraudulent claims," (2) "the prevention of suits
state .... The result is to substitute for a rule which was easy of application one
where all manner of gradations of important contacts may be present.
It may well be that the rule of lex loci delicti in some instances may appear ar-
bitrary and unfair, but at the same time it has one positive asset. It is certain.
Id. at 491-93, 211 A.2d at 596-97 (citations omitted).
33. The Babcock court clarified the statute's purpose, stating:
The object of Ontario's guest statute, it has been said, is "to prevent the fraudulent
assertion of claims by passengers, in collusion with the drivers, against insurance
companies" . . . and, quite obviously, the fraudulent claims intended to be
prevented by the statute are those asserted against Ontario defendants and their
insurance carriers, not New York defendants and their insurance carriers.
12 N.Y.2d at 482-83, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d 750 (citation omitted).
34. Id.
35. See note 27 supra.
36. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
37. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-9-1 (1963) (recodified at § 42-9-1-1 (1973)) (repealed 1975):
No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest,
without payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of action for damages
against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss in case of accident, unless
such accident shall have been intentional on the part of such owner or operator or
caused by his intoxication, or by negligence consisting of a willful and wanton
disregard of the rights of others.
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by 'ungrateful guests,'" and (3) "the priority of injured parties in other
cars in the assets of the negligent defendant."'
Assuming that prevention of potentially collusive suits was intended
to protect Colorado domiciled drivers from higher liability insurance
premium rates and that the Good Samaritan hosts intended to be pro-
tected were those domiciled in Colorado, the first two reasons would
not convert into significant interests on the part of Colorado in the ap-
plication of its guest statute. This leaves the third reason discerned by
Judge Burke, that injured parties in other cars should have priority in
the assets of the negligent defendant.
That rather unique reason for a guest statute requires some
thought. It isn't entirely clear from Judge Burke's opinion whether the
protected class consists of passengers or drivers in the "other cars," so
we should consider the wisdom of characterizing either as members of
a protected class. Assume that two cars collide. In the first car are the
driver-host (D) and the passenger-guest (P). In the second car are the
driver-host (D2) and the passenger-guest (P2). Should P2 be considered
a beneficiary of a guest statute which precludes P from recovering
from D absent gross negligence? Judge Burke's opinion implies an af-
firmative answer based on his view that the guest statute would thus
tend to assure P2 priority over P in reaching D's assets. But look at
the price P2 must pay for that "benefit." The very same guest statute
will preclude P2 from recovering from D2 absent gross negligence.
That seems to be a poor bargain to impose on P2 and probably is the
reason for the facial awkwardness of asserting that a guest statute
was intended to benefit a guest passenger. How about D2? Well, we
know that, in the typical two-car collision in which a passenger is in-
jured, counsel representing that passenger is likely to think of both
drivers as potential defendants. If either is found negligent at trial, he
will be liable for the passenger's injuries; if both are found negligent,
both will be liable and the liability will be divided between them. But
if we impose a guest statute on the facts, counsel for the injured
passenger will almost certainly focus his attention on the driver of the
other car (D2) against whom liability may be imposed on a finding of
simple negligence. Thus, the price D2 pays for the "benefit" of secur-
ing priority in reaching the assets of D is the loss of D as a potential
co-defendant and payer of half the liability tab in P's action. Not much
of a bargain; small wonder that Judge Burke's third reason for Col-
orado's guest statute is rather unique. 9
38. Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d at 124, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
39. See E. SCOLES & R. WEINTRAUB, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 477
(2d ed. 1972), where the authors remark: "The principal case seems to stand alone in ar-
ticulating as one policy of a guest statute, protection of the innocent driver of the other
automobile from having the host's assets depleted by the guest's claim."
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Despite his opinion's anomalies, Judge Burke did conclude that
assuring the occupants of other cars priority in reaching D's assets
was a reason for the Colorado guest statute. Accepting that conclusion,
it must then be asked if that reason converts into a significant Col-
orado interest in having its guest statute apply in Dym. The driver of
the other car was a Kansas domiciliary. Was he within the class in-
tended to be benefitted by Colorado's guest statute? Perhaps, since it
is possible that Colorado intended to assure priority in reaching D's
assets to occupants of other cars involved in Colorado collisions ir-
respective of where those occupants were domiciled. Consequently,
however awkward that third reason for Colorado's guest statute may
seem, and however unlikely it may be that Colorado was interested in
assuring such a benefit for Kansas domiciliaries, it is at least arguable
that Colorado may have had a significant interest in the application of
its guest statute to the facts of Dym.
In his opinion, Judge Burke distinguished Dym from Babcock by
noting that in Dym "the parties were [temporarily] dwelling in Col-
orado when the [host-guest] relationship was formed and the accident
arose out of Colorado based activity; therefore, the fact that the acci-
dent occurred in Colorado could in no sense be termed fortuitous."'0
The only way that I can attribute legal significance to this factual
distinction, however, is by redefining and enlarging the class of Good
Samaritan hosts intended to be protected by Colorado's guest statute
to include both those domiciled in Colorado and those domiciled
anywhere who enter into the host-guest relationship in Colorado.
Although I think it unlikely that Colorado in fact intended to protect
that larger class, it is possible. To the extent that the possibility is ac-
cepted, the fact that the host-guest relationship was entered into in
Colorado gives that state another significant interest in the application
of its guest statute. At least arguably, therefore, Dym is
distinguishable from Babcock in two legally significant ways and the
different results in the two cases, namely, nonapplication of the On-
tario guest statute in Babcock and application of the Colorado guest
statute in Dym, are explicable.
In the subsequent case of Macey v. Rozbicki,"' the plaintiff, Miss
Macey, and the defendant, Mrs. Rozbicki, were sisters domiciled in
New York. Mrs. Rozbicki and her husband owned a summer home in
Ontario. Miss Macey visited her sister at the summer home. During
the visit, the sisters were returning from church when the car, driven
by Mrs. Rozbicki, collided with another vehicle driven by a Canadian.
To recover for the injuries she sustained in the collision, Miss Macey
40. 16 N.Y.2d at 125, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
41. 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
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sued Mrs. Rozbicki. Factually, Macey resembles Dym. Although plain-
tiff and defendant were domiciled in New York, both were temporarily
dwelling in Ontario, the guest statute jurisdiction; the host-guest rela-
tionship was entered into in Ontario; and the passenger was injured in
a two-vehicle collision. However, the legal significance of those factual
similarities cannot be determined without examining the reason for the
Ontario guest statute.
Maintaining the reason identified by Judge Fuld in Babcock,42 namely,
preventing potentially collusive suits to assure Ontario drivers lower
liability insurance premium rates, it becomes apparent that Ontario
had no significant interest in the application of its guest statute in
Macey. Any pay-out by the host-driver's liability carrier would be
charged to its New York business dealings. Consequently, the factual
similarities between Dym and Macey were without legal significance;
the result in Babcock was equally appropriate, and did obtain, in
Macey. That's not surprising, bearing in mind that Dym involved the
potential application of the Colorado guest statute and Macey involved
the potential application of the Ontario guest statute; the two guest
statutes could actually have different underlying reasons. Only by
identifying the reasons underlying each state's local law, and determin-
ing if any of those reasons converts into a significant interest in the
application of that state's local law, can a court intelligently utilize in-
terest analysis. With that in mind, and assuming arguendo that the
reasons for Colorado's guest statute identified by Judge Burke are
valid, it becomes clear that the "apparent" inconsistency among the
results in Babcock, Dym, and Macey is resolvable.
It seems that the significance of identifying the reasons underlying
a particular state's guest statute, and the realization that different
states might have different reasons for guest statutes, eluded the New
York Court of Appeals in Tooker v. Lopez.43 There, the deceased
passenger and deceased driver had been domiciliaries of New York
temporarily residing in Michigan where they attended college. On a
planned drive to Detroit, the driver lost control of the car, which then
left the travelled path of the roadway and overturned, killing both oc-
cupants. Again, the case possessed factual similarities to Dym:"
although the driver and passenger had been domiciled in New York,
both were temporarily residing in Michigan, the guest statute state
45
42. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
43. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
44. See text accompanying notes 36 & 40 supra.
45. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2101 (1948):
[N]o person, transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest
without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages
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and the host-guest relationship had been entered into in Michigan. It
was similar to Babcock in that no second vehicle was involved. The
legal significance, if any, of those facts naturally depended upon the
reasons underlying the Michigan guest statute. 7
If the Michigan statute existed to prevent potentially collusive suits,
thereby assuring Michigan drivers of lower insurance premium rates,
that reason would not convert into a significant Michigan interest in
the application of its guest statute; any pay-out by the liability carrier
would be charged to its New York business dealings. If the Michigan
statute existed to protect Good Samaritan hosts from ungrateful
guests, the convertibility of the reason would depend on the breadth of
the class of Good Samaritans intended to be protected. If only Good
Samaritan hosts domiciled in Michigan were within the protected class,
the reason would not convert; if Good Samaritans wherever domiciled
who entered into the host-guest relationship in Michigan were within
the protected class, the reason would convert and Michigan would
have a significant interest in the application of its guest statute. If
Michigan intended to assure occupants of "other cars" priority in
reaching host driver's assets, that reason would not convert since no
other car was involved. New York, as the domicile of the deceased
passenger, obviously had a significant interest in the application of its
local law (no guest statute) which presumably exists to assure the
passenger of an opportunity to recover for the host's negligent driving.
The New York Court of Appeals implied that all guest statutes exist
for the purpose of preventing potentially collusive suits. 8 Given that
against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless
such accident shall have been caused by the gross negligence or wilful and wanton
misconduct of the owner or operator of such motor vehicle and unless such gross
negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct contributed to the injury, death or loss
for which the action is brought.
46. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
47. See Castle v. McKeown, 327 Mich. 518, 42 N.W.2d 733 (1950), where the Michigan
guest statute was construed as follows: "The purpose of the guest act is to protect owners
and operators of automobiles from liability for ordinary negligence arising during the
gratuitous passage furnished to others." Id at 520, 42 N.W.2d at 734.
48. The Tooker court concluded that:
The primary point of division in Dym v. Gordon ... focused not upon the choice-
of-law rule quoted [therein].... but rather upon the construction placed on the Col-
orado guest statute which, upon reflection, we conclude was mistaken.
The teleological argument advanced by some ... that the guest statute was in-
tended to assure the priority of injured nonguests in the assets of a negligent host,
in addition to the prevention of fraudulent claims, overlooks not only the statutory
history but the fact that the statute permits recovery by guests who can establish
that the accident was due to the gross negligence of the driver. If the purpose of
the statute is to protect the rights of the injured "nonguest", as opposed to the
owner or his insurance carrier, we fail to perceive any rational basis for predicating
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conclusion, the court found that Michigan had no interest in the ap-
plication of its guest statute and the court applied New York's local
law.
I have no quarrel with the ultimate conclusion achieved by the
court. I do, however, have serious reservations about the court's
assigning but one reason for every guest statute. It seems to me in-
disputable that different states could have guest statutes for different
reasons. Identifying the particular reason or reasons for a particular
state's statute is a necessary and critical step in interest analysis. Un-
til that is done, the court cannot accurately determine whether or not
the state has a significant interest in the application of its guest
statute. I doubt that was done in Tooker.
Apart from that, however, the result in Tooker can be justified,
even though contrary to the result in 'Dym, because of the difference
in the reasons assigned to the guest statutes of the two states,
Michigan and Colorado. Despite the factual similarities between the
two cases, the difference in results is entirely rational.
That rational basis for the different results achieved in Babcock,
Macey, and Tooker on the one hand (guest statute not applicable) and
Dym on the other (guest statute applicable), however, seems to have
escaped the attention of some other courts. To them, the different
results implied some inherent weakness in the methodology of interest
analysis, and they used that discerned weakness as a basis for their re-
jection of the methodology."0 That must have stung Judge Fuld, who
had led his court into interest analysis in Babcock." In addition, Judge
Fuld must have been a little bit discomfited by what he perceived
(probably accurately) to be a misapplication of interest analysis in
Dym.15 Presumably, if a majority of the court was capable of such a
misapplication, then interest analysis might be a tad too sophisticated
for general application. That concern, I think, may have been the sec-
ond reason for Judge Fuld's formulation of the three rules in
that protection on the degree of negligence which the guest is able to establish.
The only justification for discrimination between injured guests which can with-
stand logical as well as constitutional scrutiny.., is that the legitimate purpose of
the statute-prevention of fraudulent claims against local insurers or the protec-
tion of local automobile owners-is furthered by increasing the guest's burden of
proof...
The failure to come to grips with this problem in Macey v. Rozbicki... resulted
in a decision which has confused and clouded the choice-of-law process in New York.
24 N.Y.2d at 574-75, 249 N.E.2d at 397-98, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 523-24 (emphasis added).
49. See note 32 supra.
50. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); see text accompanying
notes 30-35 supra.
51. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965); see text accompanying
notes 36-40 supra.
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Neumeier.Y They were intended to resolve all prospective choice-of-law
problems in guest statute cases. In this manner, Judge Fuld sought to
provide judicial guidance for the resolution of the really difficult cases
through interest analysis. How well do Judge Fuld's rules accomplish
their intended purpose?
The first guest statute case to reach the New York Court of Appeals
after Neumeier" was Pahmer v. Hertz Corp." Plaintiff passenger, Mrs.
Pahmer, and defendant driver, Mr. Cullen, were New York
domiciliaries employed by the same employer and temporarily as-
signed to California. During the course of a non-business related shop-
ping trip, the car occupied by them was involved in a collision. To
recover for her injuries, the passenger sued the driver. The defendant
driver asserted the California guest statute; 5 naturally, the plaintiff
asserted the applicability of New York's local law containing no guest
statute. Which of Judge Fuld's three rules58 applies to the passenger's
case against the driver?
The awkward answer to that question is that none of the three rules
applies. Rule 1 is inapplicable because, although the passenger and the
driver were both New York domiciliaries, the car was registered in
California. Rule 2(a) doesn't apply because the driver's conduct did not
occur in the state of his domicile. Rule 2(b) doesn't apply because the
guest was not injured in the state of her domicile. And rule 3, the
"catch-all," doesn't apply because the passenger and the driver were
not domiciled in different states. The court was spared the awkward-
ness of conceding that none of the three rules applied only because the
California guest statute had been declared unconstitutional by the
California Supreme Court and thus was not available as a defense."
Pahmer strongly implies the futility of attempting to simplify the
application of interest analysis to difficult choice-of-law problems
through the formulation of a set of mechanical rules intended for pro-
52. See text accompanying notes 28 & 29 supra.
53. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972); see text accompanying
notes 24-28 supra.
54. 32 N.Y.2d 119, 296 N.E.2d 243, 343 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1973).
55. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17158 (West 1959) (amended 1973), states:
[N]o person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a highway without
giving compensation for such ride . . . has any right of action for civil damages
against the driver of the vehicle or against any other person legally liable for the
conduct of the driver on account of personal injury to or the death of the ... guest
during the ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action establishes that the injury or
death proximately resulted from the intoxication or willful misconduct of the
driver.
56. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
57. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
58. Pahmer v. Hertz Corp., 32 N.Y.2d at 122, 296 N.E.2d at 245, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
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spective application. While the judicial aim for predictability of result
and the relative comfort of stare decisis is wholly understandable,
Judge Fuld's efforts to achieve those goals seem unrealistic on the
whole. I believe instead that an interest analysis court simply ought to
be more patient in its desire to achieve stare decisis.5 1 Once a court
resolves a series of guest statute cases (Babcock through Tooker, for
example)," a natural form of stare decisis through accretion will
emerge. It will become apparent that the particular reasons for a par-
ticular state's guest statute must be identified. Then those underlying
reasons must be applied to the facts of the case to determine which, if
any, convert into significant interests on the part of that state in hav-
ing its guest statute applied. Precisely the same thing must be done
with regard to the non-guest statute state. Only then can the court
determine which state's interests are the more significant.
If the court concludes that State A's guest statute exists exclusively
for the purpose of preventing potentially collusive suits, and that the
host's car is garaged and insured in the forum state which has no
guest statute, the court should certainly conclude that State A has no
significant interest in the application of its guest statute. If the
passenger is domiciled in the forum state and that state's law exists to
enable a passenger to recover from a negligent host, the forum will
have a significant interest in the application of its local law. The princi-
ple of stare decisis emerges the next time that court finds itself con-
fronted with a similar choice-of-law problem presenting the same
underlying reasons for each state's local law and the same factual pat-
tern. But if the underlying reasons for the local laws or the factual pat-
tern changes, the first case cannot be controlling. Stare decisis should
not be tortured into a rigid rule which applies despite factual distinc-
59. On this point, I would concur in Professor Weintraub's particularly apt language:
The [New York] Court of Appeals' quest for conflicts rules is understandable.
Given the complexity that is possible in the new conflicts analysis, a court may well
wish to avoid treating every conflicts case as a new problem to be analyzed from
scratch. The safest way to implement a rules approach is to wait until the court has
decided a variety of cases focusing on the same choice-of-law problem. If the results
of these cases can be succinctly and clearly summarized, this summary of the pat-
tern of decided cases can provide "rules" to guide the court, lower courts, and at-
torneys. When, however, a rule articulated by a court purports to be broader than
the pattern of already decided cases, this is a more hazardous undertaking. At the
very least, the court should think through the fact patterns that are likely to occur
in future cases and see whether in those situations it would desire the result dic-
tated by the new rules.
WEINTRAUB'S COMMENTARY, supra note 2, at 317 (footnotes omitted).
60. See text accompanying notes 48-49 supra.
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tions having legal significance. I think Judge Fuld's three rules as set
forth in Neumeier' would have that unfortunate effect.
Next to be considered are Professor Weintraub's plaintiff-favoring
rules.2 After concluding that neither Ontario nor New York had a
significant interest in the application of its local law in Neumeier,"
presumably the case would be characterized as a "no interest" case
under rule 36' That rule directs the application of New York's plaintiff-
favoring local law (no guest statute) so long as that law is not
anachronistic or aberrational (I think it is neither) and so long as New
York has a sufficient contact with the defendant (I think it does, since
the driver was domiciled there). Therefore, New York's law would apply
and the plaintiff could recover from the defendant on a showing of sim-
ple negligence. In a case where neither state has a significant interest
in the application of its own local law, achieving the result under rule 3
is clean and simple. Since Neumeier is generally considered a difficult
case, the relative ease of resolution presented by Professor
Weintraub's rule 3 becomes especially appealing. Moreover, as it hap-
pens (in a wholly fortuitous manner, to borrow a popular phrase from
the case law of conflicts) the forum state (New York) is the state with
the plaintiff-favoring law, thus the forum is then less likely to be of-
fended by Professor Weintraub's preference for that law. Of course, if
Ontario were the forum, the court might not agree with Professor
Weintraub's implied characterization of its defendant-protecting law as
antiquated.
There is, I think, an additional problem with the application of Pro-
fessor Weintraub's rule 3 to Neumeier. Rule 3 implies that, since
neither Ontario nor New York had a significant interest in the applica-
tion of its own local law, the facts present a "no interest" case.65 I
disagree, for after a court concludes that neither state has a significant
interest in the application of its own local law, it should then drop
down to a somewhat lower level of interest and inquire if either state
has a minimal interest in the litigation. Clearly, Ontario has a minimal
interest in the litigation arising out of the Ontario domicile of the de-
ceased passenger and his dependent survivors. In addition, it is equally
61. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
62. See text accompanying notes 3 & 17-21 supra.
63. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972); see text accompanying
notes 26-27 supra
64. See text accompanying note 3 supra. I assume that Professor Weintraub's rule 3
would apply, notwithstanding the fact that one of the involved states is a Canadian
province. Professor Weintraub considered rule 3 applicable, stating: "I would decide
Neumeier under my rule 3 and reach the result opposite that reached by the New York
Court of Appeals." WEINTRAUB'S COMMENTARY, supra note 2, at 347.
65. See text accompanying notes 3 & 22 supra.
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clear that this minimal interest would best be served by the applica-
tion of New York's local law affording the opportunity of recovery for
the dependent survivors, thereby reducing the likelihood of their
becoming indigent wards of Ontario. (Since we have already concluded
that Ontario has no significant interest in the application of its guest
statute, consideration of Ontario's minimal interest, even though best
served by the application of New York's local law, creates no internal
conflict for Ontario.) Therefore, Ontario does indeed have an interest: a
minimal interest in the economic integrity of the Ontario domiciled sur-
vivors which is best served by the application of New York's local law.
Similarly, New York has a minimal interest in the litigation arising
out of the deceased driver's New York domicile and the resulting
presence of his estate and presumably the estate beneficiaries in New
York. Clearly, this minimal interest of New York would best be served
by the application of Ontario's guest statute, thereby diminishing the
likelihood of recovery and preserving the New York estate. (Since we
have already concluded that New York has no significant interest in
the application of its local law, consideration of New York's minimal in-
terest, even though best served by the application of Ontario's local
law, creates no internal conflict for New York.) Therefore, New York
does have an interest: a minimal interest in preserving the New York
estate of the deceased driver for the New York beneficiaries, which in-
terest is best served by the application of Ontario's local law.
Such recognition of a state's minimal interest in the litigation is by
no means novel or extraordinary. It has been done, though perhaps
with somewhat different nomenclature, in nearly all of those cases
characterized as "false conflicts." As we have seen,8 the essence of a
false conflict case is that one state has a significant interest in the ap-
plication of its own local law, the second state has no significant in-
terest in the application of its contrary local law; the second state,
however, has a minimal interest in the litigation which is best served
by the application of the first state's local law. All we have done is to
utilize each state's minimal interest in the litigation in a true rather
than a false conflict case, after determining that neither state has a
significant interest in the application of its own local law.
The inquiry into the presence of a minimal interest on the part of
each state, after having determined that neither state had a significant
interest in the application of its own local law, reveals that, in fact,
Neumeier is not a "no interest" case. (Indeed, it is unlikely that there
are many, if any, "no interest" cases.) We have discovered instead that
66. See Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see text accompanying notes
4 & 13-15 supra
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each state has a minimal interest in the litigation best served by the
application of the other state's local law. What was a negative stand-off
at the first level of interest, has become a rather evenly balanced set
of competing interests at the second level of interest. The next ques-
tion is how to resolve that neatly balanced set of competing interests.
Assume that counsel for the plaintiff offers and the court receives
information indicating that the deceased driver had liability insurance
applicable to the collision and that the limits of that liability insurance
policy are more than adequate to cover any recovery which the plain-
tiff may enjoy. How does that enhanced degree of specificity affect the
competing interests? It becomes clear as a result that if Ontario's in-
terest in the dependent survivors which is best served by New York's
local law prevails, then New York's interest in the New York estate
and its beneficiaries will not be adversely affected. Any recovery by
the Ontario plaintiff will not reduce the dollar value of the New York
estate or the share in the estate of any New York beneficiary. This
would seem to indicate that the court should apply New York's local
law.
Is there any impropriety in the court's consideration of the ex-
istence and amount of liability insurance? New York, like most states,
will not permit the existence of liability insurance to be made known
to a jury," lest that information distort the jury's two-step process of
determining liability and (assuming an affirmative determination)
damages into a single step of deciding how much to award the plaintiff.
Judicial consideration of the insurance information can be easily ac-
complished, however, without apprising the jury of that information.
Frequently, such as in Neumeier," choice-of-law issues are resolved
long before jury selection and trial, so that providing the court with in-
surance information by brief and oral argument will not subvert the
jury process. Moreover, even where the choice-of-law issue is reserved
until trial, counsel and the court will have simple methods available for
informing the court and not the jury: side-bar conferences or jury
recesses. Therefore, judicial consideration of the insurance information
need not frustrate the integrity of the jury's functions.
Perhaps a broader question should be asked. Generally, how should
a court determine the propriety of considering additional information
67. See 01tarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577
(1965), which refers to this settled policy, although Oltarsh ultimately permitted a direct
action against the insurer on a cause of action arising in Puerto Rico, which had a direct-
action statute. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 26, § 2003 (1958). Subsequently, Puerto Rico amended
its direct-action statute to limit direct actions against insurers to actions brought in Puerto
Rico. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, § 2003 (1966).
68. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
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offered by counsel for the purpose of providing an enhanced degree of
specificity in resolving a choice-of-law problem? I think the court
should ask two questions: Would judicial consideration of the offered
information be constitutionally permissible? Would judicial considera-
tion of the offered information be unlikely to generate adverse conse-
quences in the future? 9 If both questions are answered affirmatively,
then the court should consider the information. Does judicial considera-
tion of the existence and amount of liability insurance violate any con-
stitutional right of the defendant? Arguably, no. The constitutional
provision most likely to be asserted would be the equal protection
clause." Presumably, the defendant would assert that: (1) the wealthy
are more likely to have liability insurance or liability insurance in a
substantial amount than the not so wealthy; and, therefore, (2) con-
sidering that information may generate one conflicts rule for the rich
and another for the poor, which jeopardizes the rich defendant's in-
terest in the litigation. Economic status, however, has not been
characterized as a suspect classification, 1 so that the standard under
the equal protection clause of strict judicial scrutiny is not applicable.
Under the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the
state action bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state pur-
pose or interest, 2 the court's consideration of the profered information
is a reasonable means of resolving an evenly matched choice-of-law
issue. Consequently, the equal protection argument would not be ex-
pected to prevail under the normal constitutional standard of review.
Presumably, then, the defendant would make the further argument
that judicial consideration of the existence and amount of liability in-
surance, because of its ultimate harm to a defendant's position in litiga-
tion, will tend to dissuade drivers from purchasing substantial liability
insurance. Is such a result likely? Probably not, since there are many
cogent reasons for obtaining substantial liability insurance. Because of
these reasons, basing the choice-of-law result on the existence and
amount of liability insurance is not likely to dissuade drivers from pur-
chasing such protection for themselves, their families, and their assets.
69. See Seidelson, Interest Analysis and an Enhanced Degree of Specificity: The
Wrongful Death Action, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 525, 539 (1972).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states: "No state shall ...deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
71. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977). ("[T]his Court has never held that
financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis").
Absent a suspect class, "the ... scheme must ... be examined to determine whether it
rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose . I..." d. at 470 (quoting
San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)). See also Harris v. McRae,
100 S. Ct. 2671, 2691 (1980).
72. See note 71 supra.
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Therefore, the evidence of liability insurance is an entirely appropriate
object of judicial consideration and, obviously, such consideration
would be highly relevant in determining which state's interest should
prevail. In fact, in our analysis of Neumeier, such judicial consideration
would probably be determinative. The evidence of liability insurance
would apprise the court that Ontario's interest in the economic integ-
rity of its domiciled dependents, served by the application of New
York's local law, could be fulfilled without frustrating New York's in-
terest in the New York estate and the beneficiaries of the estate. Upon
such evidence, the court could identify an excellent solution to an ap-
parently difficult choice-of-law problem, one which serves the legiti-
mate interest 3 of one state without frustrating the competing interest
of the other state.
Suppose, however, there was no applicable liability insurance, or
counsel did not offer such information and the court did not request it.
The court would be left to decide between competing minimal interests
of equal weight: Ontario's concern for the surviving dependents, best
served by New York's local law, and New York's concern for the estate
and its beneficiaries, best served by Ontario's local law. A court would
have to seek another source of guidance in order to resolve that dif-
ficult choice-of-law issue.
It is here that I find helpful the "comparative impairment"" phrase
fashioned by the California Supreme Court for the guidance of courts
confronted with difficult choice-of-law issues. Frankly, I'm not certain
that I entirely and precisely understand what the California court con-
templates when it utilizes the phrase.", The best I can do is to indicate
what the phrase implies to me. A court confronted with an evenly
balanced set of competing interests should attempt to determine which
state's interest would be more frustrated by the application of the
disserving local law and then avoid that greater frustration. To my
mind, that technique is an inherent part of interest analysis. It in part
describes the process of determining which state's interest is the more
intense. Moreover, it is useful both at the primary level of competing
significant interests in determining the application of each state's own
73. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
74. See Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148
Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 215 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
75. See Kanowitz, Comparative Impairment and Better Law: Grand Illusions in the
Conflict of Laws, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 255 (1978); Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment
to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CALIF. L. REV.
577 (1980). Both authors are critical of the California court's use of comparative impair-
ment. For a recent judicial application of comparative impairment, see Lettieri v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 627 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1980).
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local law and at the secondary level of competing minimal interests
best served by the other state's local law. Applying the measure of
comparative impairment to the facts of Neumeier78 illustrates the
point.
It is apparent that Ontario's minimal interest in the economic in-
tegrity of the Ontario domiciled survivors, best served by New York's
local law, would be frustrated by the application of Ontario's guest
statute. The statute would render more difficult and might preclude a
recovery for those survivors, thereby enhancing the possibility of their
becoming indigent wards of Ontario. Similarly, New York's minimal in-
terest in preserving the economic integrity of the New York estate
and estate beneficiaries, best served by the application of Ontario's
guest statute, would be frustrated by the application of New York's
local law. Absent a guest statute, the threat of depleting the estate
and diminishing each heir's share is enhanced. The question for the
court would be which of the two possible results entails the greater
frustration of a state interest.
The Ontario survivors, denied the family provider as the result of
the alleged negligence of the New York driver, are dependent sur-
vivors because of that loss. Moreover, the dependent survivors should
be viewed as occupying the position in which the passenger would
have been, had he survived, vis-a-vis the culpable driver; the depen-
dent survivors become the derivative victims of the driver's alleged
negligence. In the position of substitute victims, the surviving
dependents should be attributed as strong a right of recovery as the
passenger would have possessed had he survived. Assume that the ac-
cident had not caused death, but that both passenger and driver had
received injuries which incapacitated them to the extent that their in-
digency was likely. Since the passenger's incapacitating injuries and
probable indigency were caused by the driver's alleged negligence,"'
the passenger's plight would present a more compelling case for com-
pensation than would the plight of the allegedly culpable driver." It
seems appropriate to impute the position of the victim of the
76. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
77. Emphasizing the alleged negligence and culpability of the host driver in this
analysis seems entirely appropriate, given that the issue before the court is one of choice-
of-law. The court is deciding the limited question of whether the plaintiff may recover
from the defendant, assuming arguendo that the host driver was negligent.
78. It is important to keep in mind at this point that Ontario has no significant in-
terest in applying its guest statute and New York has no significant interest in applying
its policy favoring recovery by passenger domiciliaries from negligent drivers: see text ac-
companying notes 26-27 supra- Since both the policy behind Ontario's local law and the
policy behind New York's local law are now irrelevant, the question of compensation is
open and must be decided on other grounds.
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negligence to his dependent survivors in order to avoid indirectly
"rewarding" the New York estate beneficiaries because of the driver's
death. The beneficiaries of the driver's estate cannot be designated as
victims since the driver's death resulted from his own negligence. Nor
have the New York beneficiaries been denied the family provider be-
cause of any negligence attributable to the deceased passenger. It may
even be the case that the New York beneficiaries were not financially
dependent upon the driver. The Ontario survivors, however, would
have to be dependent survivors of the deceased passenger, or the legal
equivalent thereof, in order to share in any recovery which may be
secured. 9 The New York estate beneficiaries need not have been finan-
cially dependent upon the deceased driver; one may become the
beneficiary of either an intestate or testate regardless of one's
economic relationship with the decedent. Consequently, the interest of
New York in keeping an estate intact for its beneficiaries, an interest
predicated upon diminishing the risk that the beneficiaries will become
indigent wards of the state, is less likely to be impaired by the absence
of a guest statute.
On the other hand, the frustration of Ontario's minimal interest, by
the application of Ontario's guest statute, would seem to be more likely
to produce a result sought to be avoided, namely, having the Ontario
dependents become indigent wards of that state. The application of
New York's local law would be less likely to produce a result seriously
frustrating New York's minimal interest. If the Ontario dependents are
permitted a recovery based on the driver's negligence, the New York
beneficiaries of the estate would lose only a diminished portion of a
fund to which they had no legal right to look for continued subsistence.
Therefore, Ontario's minimal interest in the litigation would seem to
be more intense than New York's minimal interest, so that the court
should apply that local law (New York's) which would not frustrate the
Ontario interest.
That, of course, is the same result which Professor Weintraub's rule
3 produced much more quickly and easily. The facility of rule 3,
however, can be achieved only at the price of ignoring the very real in-
terest which each state has in the litigation and by imposing on the
court an external conclusion that plaintiff-favoring laws are superior.
79. ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 164, § 3(1) (1960) states:
Every action brought under this [Fatal Accidents] Act is for the benefit of the
wife, husband, parent and child of the person whose death was so caused ... and in
every such action such damages may be awarded as are proportioned to the injury
resulting from the death to the persons respectively for whom and for whose
benefit the action is brought, and the amount so recovered ...shall be divided
among the above-mentioned persons in such shares as are determined at the trial.
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By identifying each state's minimal interest in the litigation, the
premature and ultimately incorrect characterization of the case as be-
ing one of "no interest" is avoided. Moreover, encouraging the forum
to engage in a judicial determination of "comparative impairment," in-
vites the court to make its own reasoned decision as to which state's
interest is the more intense. In my estimation, most courts in most cir-
cumstances, left to their own determination of comparative impair-
ment, would find the state interest in the potential indigency of the
victim more intense than a competing state interest in protecting the
economic integrity of the defendant. In those cases where that does
not occur, I would still be unwilling to impose on the courts a contrary
determination based on an extrinsic conclusion that plaintiff-favoring
laws are better.
In Tramontana v. Varig Airlines," a disinterested forum was re-
quired to determine whether to impose Brazil's ceiling on recovery in
personal injury and wrongful death actions arising out of airplane
disasters. The United States Navy Band was touring South America
when a Navy plane carrying certain members of the band was involved
in a catastrophic mid-air collision with a commercial Varig Airlines
flight over Brazil. Everyone aboard both planes was killed. The plain-
tiff, a Maryland domiciliary and the widow of one of the band mem-
bers, brought a wrongful death action against Varig. The defendant
asserted the applicability of Brazil's 100,000 cruzeiro ($170) limitation
on recovery in such actions. After rejecting the plaintiff's argument
that the Brazilian ceiling should not be imposed because it was offen-
sive to a public policy of the forum (the District of Columbia),8' the
court examined the competing state interests. Maryland's local law
contained no such ceiling, presumably for the purpose of protecting the
economic integrity of injured Maryland domiciliaries. Since the plain-
80. 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966). The full
defendant's name is S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, t/a Varig Airlines. I
have used Varig Airlines in the case name in the text to facilitate identification.
81. The court of appeals found that the District of Columbia did not have a signifi-
cant interest at stake:
The District of Columbia's connection with the occurrence and with the parties,
and its interest in the resolution of the issue before us, are, if not wholly remote,
certainly less than Brazil's. Neither [plaintiff] nor her decedent are or were
residents [sic] of the District of Columbia. Varig Airlines is subject to suit here only
because of the international operations in which it is engaged. Whatever negligence
it may have been guilty of assuredly did not occur here, nor, manifestly, did the
decedent's death. If [plaintiff] and her children should ever become public charges,
the burden will rest not on the District of Columbia but on the citizens of
Maryland, where [plaintiff] resides.
Id. at 473 (footnote omitted).
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tiff was a Maryland domiciliary, she was precisely within the class in-
tended to be protected. Clearly, Maryland had a significant interest in
the application of its local law. Brazil's ceiling existed for the purpose
of protecting Brazil's airlines. Obviously Varig was within the pro-
tected class and Brazil had a significant interest in the application of
its local law. Consequently, the court confronted the task of deciding
which state's interest was more significant. The court offered this view
of the intensity of Brazil's interest:
Varig is a Brazilian corporation which, as a national airline, is an object of
concern in terms of national policy. To Brazil, the success of this enter-
prise is a matter not only of pride and commercial well-being, but perhaps
even of national security. The limitation on recovery against airlines
operating in Brazil was enacted in the early days of commercial aviation,
no doubt with a view toward protecting what was then, and still is, an in-
fant industry of extraordinary public and national importance. The
Brazilian limitation in terms applies only to airplane accidents, unlike the
Massachusetts provision rejected in Kilberg, which was an across-the-
board ceiling on recovery for wrongful death in that state. The focus of
Brazilian concern could hardly be clearer.'
In fashioning its local law, Brazil saw fit to focus upon one particular
activity and to provide a protective ceiling on liability to those en-
gaged in that activity. Moreover, as the language excerpted from the
court's opinion indicates, that particular activity had a significant,
perhaps unique, importance to Brazil. Were the ceiling on recovery not
imposed, the defendant would be exposed to unlimited liability in each
of the wrongful death actions arising out of the deaths of the Navy
band members. As a result, Brazil's airline might face the alternative
possibilities of severe financial difficulty, perhaps bankruptcy, or the
need for the infusion of substantial additional government funds, which
is an unhappy prospect for a government dealing with triple-digit infla-
tion. None of these arguments, however, serves to denigrate
Maryland's interest. If the Maryland domiciled widow were limited to
a recovery of $170, Maryland's interest in her economic integrity
would be acutely frustrated, perhaps even to the point of the widow's
becoming an indigent ward of the state. It is apparent that Brazil and
Maryland each had a significant interest in the application of its own
local law.
Given this true conflict case, Professor Weintraub's rule 2 would ap-
ply. Under that rule, Maryland's no-ceiling law would apply, provided
that law were not anachronistic or aberrational and provided that
Maryland had "sufficient contact with the defendant or the defendant's
82. I& at 471 (footnote omitted).
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actual or intended course of conduct to make application of its law
reasonable."83 The first condition is easily satisfied and a plausible
argument exists for satisfying the second. Varig's conduct involved the
operation of a commercial flight over Brazil with knowledge that other
flights under other flags would be using that airspace. In all likelihood,
Varig knew or should have known of the presence of the United States
Navy plane and of the status of its occupants, domiciliaries of various
states of the United States. Therefore, I am inclined to guess that Pro-
fessor Weintraub would conclude that Maryland's plaintiff-favoring law
should apply. The court concluded otherwise.
In resolving the difficult choice-of-law issue, the disinterested forum
saw fit (apparently sua sponte)" to look to Maryland's conflicts law85
for additional insight into the significance which Maryland itself would
attach to its concern with the economic integrity of the Maryland
domiciled widow. What the forum discovered was that a Maryland
court confronted with the same case would impose the Brazilian ceiling
although this would jeopardize the economic welfare of the Maryland
domiciled widow. To the District of Columbia forum, Maryland's con-
flicts law implied a diminution of the intensity of Maryland's interest
83. See text accompanying note 3 supra. I am assuming that Professor Weintraub's
rule 2 would apply, notwithstanding the fact that one of the interested states was Brazil.
See note 64 supra.
84. The court undertook the consideration of Maryland law stating:
Although Maryland, the state of the decedent's and [plaintiffs] residence, might
be thought to have a substantial interest in the amount recoverable for his death,
no suggestion has been made that we should apply the law of Maryland to deter-
mine the issue before us. But this possibility inevitably suggests itself, and we
therefore are inclined to say why we think that, even as between the law of
Maryland and the law of Brazil, we are without warrant to look to the former.
305 F.2d at 473 (footnote omitted).
85. The court cited section 2 of Maryland's wrongful death statute which provides
that, in suits based on acts committed outside the state:
[T]he courts of this State shall apply the law of such other state, District of Colum-
bia or territory of the United States, to the facts of the particular case, as though
such foreign law were the law of this State, provided, however, that the rules of
pleading and procedure effective in the court of this State in which the action is
pending govern and be so applied as to give effect to the rights and obligations
created by and existing under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction in which the
wrongful act, neglect or default occurred ....
350 F.2d at 474 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 67, § 2 (1957)) (emphasis added by the court).
86. The Tramontana court concluded that: "[I]t appears likely that a Maryland court
would not have ignored the Brazilian limitation on recovery if this action had been
brought there originally." 350 F.2d at 473-74. The court's conclusion was subsequently cor-
roborated by White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966), in which the Maryland
Court of Appeals applied lex loci delicti even to the economic detriment of its own
domiciliary. See Note, 27 MD. L. REv. 85 (1966).
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and a relative enhancement of Brazil's interest; consequently, the
forum applied the Brazilian ceiling on recovery.
I think the technique utilized by the court was entirely rational. The
forum's determination of which state's interest was more significant, in
a case in which each state had a significant interest in the application
of its own local law, was influenced and ultimately resolved by the
forum's conclusion as to the intensity of interest which would be
manifested by a court sitting in one of the interested states. That ap-
proach is, in my view, more appropriate and seemly than resolving the
choice-of-law issue by the application of a wholly extrinsic rule, such as
Professor Weintraub's rule 2, based on an isolated determination that
plaintiff-favoring laws are the better rules of law. No matter how ac-
curately stated its factual rationale may be, Professor Weintraub's rule
does not have the effect of diminishing the significance of Brazil's in-
terest in Varig Airlines or of enhancing the interest of Maryland in the
economic integrity of Mrs. Tramontana. Those interests remain con-
stant despite the rule. But the forum's acquired knowledge that a
Maryland court would impose the Brazilian ceiling, despite the
economic jeopardy in which this would place the Maryland domiciliary,
does support diminishing Maryland's concern for the economic integ-
rity of the surviving widow. Maryland has manifested a willingness to
compromise this interest, as evidenced by the opinions of its courts"
and the broad language of its wrongful death statute.88 The Tramon-
tana court wisely relied on statements made by one of the interested
states in evaluating the interest of that state, rather than on an extrin-
sic conclusion as to the generally better rule of law.
In Tramontana, because the decedent was a member of the Navy
band being transported on a Navy plane during a goodwill tour of
South America, an inference readily arises that the United States had
an interest in the choice-of-law issue presented. While it is speculation
on my part, I find myself inclined toward the view that the court must
have been cognizant of that national interest."9 Assuming such a subtle
87. The Tramontana court cited, for example, King v. Cooper Motor Lines, Inc., 142
F. Supp. 405 (D. Md. 1956); Kaufman v. Service Trucking Co., 139 F. Supp. 1 (D. Md. 1956);
Wilson v. Dailey, 191 Md. 472, 62 A.2d 284 (1948); see 350 F.2d at 474 n.16.
88. See note 85 supra.
89. The Tramontana court noted that:
After this appeal was heard, the Court of Claims of the United States, pursuant
to a reference by Congress, recommended an award of $25,000 to the families of
each of these eighteen decedents. Armiger et al. Estates v. United States, 339 F.2d
625 (Ct.Cl.1964). This recommendation was founded on purely equitable grounds,
and rested upon the circumstance that, prior to the fatal flight, there had been a
failure to follow the usual practice of distributing application forms for private
flight insurance. The possibility of suit against the United States under the Federal
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judicial sensitivity, one may infer the court's awareness of the
possibility that Congress might enact special bills to provide compensa-
tion to the surviving dependents of the deceased Navy band members
for the purpose of augmenting existing veterans benefits compensation
and assuring that those dependent survivors did not become indigent
wards of any state." Given the virtually unfettered freedom of Con-
gress in determining the amounts to be so awarded to those depen-
dents, and the considerably less acute inflation problem in the United
States as compared with that in Brazil, the enactment of such special
bills would be unlikely to impose an undue burden on this country.
Consequently, the national interests in preserving the economic in-
tegrity of the dependent survivors without threatening the nation's
economy could appropriately be fulfilled by congressional action. This
also suggests the propriety of the conclusion achieved by the Tramon-
tana court. The court inferred that leaving to Congress the decision of
what economic relief, if any, to afford the dependents would impair the
interest of the United States less than the nonapplication of the
Brazilian ceiling would have impaired Brazil's interest.
To summarize, in Neumeier, the facts and local laws apparently did
not present a "no interest" case because each state (Ontario and New
York) had a minimal and competing interest in the litigation. More-
over, recognizing those competing minimal interests seems to be the
first step in resolving the difficult choice-of-law issue presented by the
case. Presenting the court with an enhanced degree of specificity (the
existence of applicable liability insurance, for example)9 may enable
the court to achieve a resolution which serves one state's interest
without frustrating the other state's competing interest, thereby
resolving the issue in the most satisfactory manner possible. Absent
such enhanced specificity, the court would be compelled to decide
which state's minimal interest is the more intense and then apply that
local law which serves the more intense interest. In Tramontana, the
additional insight available to the court from an examination of
Maryland's conflicts law made it possible for the court to determine
Tort Claims Act is precluded by that statute's express exclusion of claims "arising
in a foreign country." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k).
350 F.2d at 470 n.3. In addition, "[u]nder the Federal Tort Claims Act . . . the United
States is not liable for injuries sustained by servicemen, while on active duty .... " Ar-
miger v. United States, 339 F.2d 625, 628 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (citing Feres v. United States, 340
U.S. 135 (1950)).
90. See note 89 supro. Congress followed the recommendation of the court of claims
and by private law awarded $25,000 "to the estate of each of the former members of the
United States Navy Band" who had died in the mid-air collision. Priv. L. No. 89-363, 80
Stat. 1670 (1966).
91. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
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which state's interest in the application of its own local law was the
more significant. And, if my speculation is correct, the Tramontana
court may have been subtly influenced by its recognition of the in-
terests of the United States. In neither case would it be necessary
(nor, in my opinion, appropriate) for the court to utilize a pre-
determined conclusion of the better rule of law. In Neumeier, recogni-
tion of each state's minimal interest in the litigation, and in Tramon-
tana, examination of Maryland's conflicts law, would lead to a rational
resolution without recourse to a "no interest" characterization of the
first case and an extrinsically identified better law in both cases.
Another case which affords an opportunity to compare Professor
Weintraub's rules with the approach I have suggested, additionally il-
lustrates a somewhat surprising application of Judge Fuld's rules. In
Himes v. Stalker,92 the plaintiff, a Pennsylvania domiciliary, was in-
jured in a two-car collision in New York. To recover for her injuries,
the plaintiff sued the driver of the other car and the parents of the
driver as the owners of the car; all the defendants were also Penn-
sylvania domicilaries. The plaintiffs theory of liability against the
defendant driver was negligent operation, and it presented no choice-
of-law problem. Her theory of liability against the defendant owners
was New York's owner liability law; 3 that theory did present a choice-
of-law issue since Pennsylvania's local law did not provide for such
owner liability. The plaintiff moved to dismiss the owners' defense of
no liability based on Pennsylvania law. The New York trial-level court
found Judge Fuld's rules94 determinative. Although the court recog-
nized that those rules had been fashioned by Judge Fuld to resolve
guest statute choice-of-law problems,9 5 the court felt that the rules im-
plied a general reversion to lex loci delicti. Finding that application of
Pennsylvania's local law, which did not provide for owner liability,
would not significantly advance Pennsylvania's interests,' the court
92. 99 Misc. 2d 610, 416 N.Y.S.2d 986 (Sup. Ct., Cattaraugus County 1979). For a
discussion of Himes, see Herzog, Conflict of Laws, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 89, 128 (1980).
93. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388(1) (McKinney 1959) states:
Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and
responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in
the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by
any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of
such owner ....
94. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
95. 99 Misc. 2d at 618-19, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
96. Id
97. The court determined that the substantive law of New York would be advanced
by the application of lex loci delict, whereas
The only discernible advancement to the substantive law of Pennsylvania that
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applied New York's owner liability law under lex loci delicti. Conse-
quently, the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the owners' defense was
granted.
I have several reactions to the court's application of Judge Fuld's
rules. First, I think it was inappropriate to fashion a result for a non-
guest statute case out of a set of rules intended to apply to guest
statute cases. Second, whenever one constructs a set of mechanical
rules intended to facilitate interest analysis, one should be aware that
a court may use those rules to avoid the mental discipline required for
rational resolution through interest analysis. Third, since the court
avoided that discipline, its opinion sheds little light on the basis for its
conclusion that application of Pennsylvania's local law would not
significantly advance that state's interests. The Himes court failed to
analyze the reasons underlying Pennsylvania's local law simply
because, it appears, the New York Court of Appeals had implied that
the rule of lex loci delicti had been reestablished by the Neumeier
decision. 8
Professor Weintraub's rules, on the other hand, do not invite that
kind of reaction from a court. His rules provide a quick resolution only
after the court has completed the rigors of analyzing the reasons for
each state's local law and the convertibility of each reason into a
significant state interest in light of the particular facts of the case.
Consequently, until that analysis is completed, one cannot know which
of his three rules would apply.
Such an analysis of New York's owner liability law would reveal
that it apparently has two purposes: to provide the injured plaintiff
with a financially responsible defendant and to encourage the owner to
be more circumspect in deciding to whom to lend or lease his vehicle."
If the class of plaintiffs intended to be benefited by the presence of a
financially responsible defendant consists of New York domiciled plain-
tiffs, that first reason does not convert into a significant interest,
given the Pennsylvania domicile of the actual plaintiff in Himes. The
would accrue by rejecting the "lex loci delicti" rule and applying the agency doc-
trine of that state would be to protect Pennsylvania insurance companies and con-
tinue non-proven and speculatively lower liability insurance premiums for the
automobile owners of that state.
99 Misc. 2d at 620-21, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
98. For the proposition that Neumeier represents a general reversion to lex loci
delict the Himes court cited a statement of the New York Court of Appeals: "It is true
that lex loci delicti remains the general rule in tort cases to be displaced only in extraor-
dinary circumstances (see Neumeier v. Kuehner .... )." Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc.,
44 N.Y.2d 698, 699, 376 N.E.2d 914, 915, 405 N.Y.S.2d 441, 442 (1978) (per curiam) (citation
in original), quoted at 99 Misc. 2d at 619, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
99. See White v. Smith, 398 F. Supp. 130 (D.N.J. 1975).
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second reason, on the other hand, concerns regulating the conduct of
the owner. In Himes, the owners' consent to lending their car to their
child occurred in Pennsylvania. However, their decision to permit their
offspring to drive their car in New York created reasonably foresee-
able consequences in that state. Under those circumstances, I submit
that New York's interest in conduct regulation converts into a signifi-
cant interest in the application of New York's local law. When one
reason for a state's law is conduct regulation, I believe that reason con-
verts into a significant interest on the part of that state in the applica-
tion of its law if: (1) the conduct occurred in that state; or (2) the im-
mediate consequences of that conduct occurred in that state; or (3) the
continuing consequences of that conduct will be felt in that state.
Presumably, a state's interest in regulating conduct rests on a desire
to avoid the immediate or continuing adverse consequences made pos-
sible by such conduct. Consequently, if the conduct occurs within the
state, thereby generating its reasonably forseeable consequences
within the state, or the immediate consequences occur within the state,
or the continuing consequences will be felt within the state, the state's
interest in conduct regulation converts into a significant interest. I
would conclude, therefore, that the occurrence of the collision in New
York, with the Pennsylvania bailee driving one of the cars, gave New
York a significant interest in the application of its owner liability law.
With regard to Pennsylvania, its local law imposes no liability on
the owner for injuries inflicted by the negligent driving of the bailee.
Apparently, Pennsylvania's policy is that the nonculpable owner should
be immune from liability. Its interest is in protecting the economic in-
tegrity of the innocent Pennsylvania owner. Since the owners in the
case were Pennsylvania domiciliaries, they would seem to fall precisely
within the protected class and Pennsylvania would seem to have a
significant interest in the application of its local law protecting owners
from liability. The plaintiff in Himes, however, was a Pennsylvania
domiciliary. Does Pennsylvania have an interest in her economic in-
tegrity and, therefore, in her capacity to recover from the financially
responsible owners? Of course not. Pennsylvania's owner-protecting
law is intended to immunize Pennsylvania owners from liability to
Pennsylvania plaintiffs as well as from liability to non-Pennsylvania
plaintiffs. In fact, in the majority of cases applying Pennsylvania law,
it will be Pennsylvania domiciled plaintiffs who will be unable to
recover from Pennsylvania domiciled owners.
Pennsylvania, therefore, has no divided interest. Its express interest
is in protecting the economic integrity of Pennsylvania owners against
plaintiffs wherever domiciled. Note, however, that what is being
discussed is Pennsylvania's significant interest in the application of its
own local law. Once it is concluded that Pennsylvania has a significant
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interest in the application of its local law, the question of whether
Pennsylvania has a minimal interest in the litigation is irrelevant. Pur-
suing that inquiry generates a spurious internal conflict on the part of
Pennsylvania. In a situation involving either a Pennsylvania domiciled
plaintiff or a plaintiff domiciled elsewhere, and a Pennsylvania domiciled
owner, Pennsylvania has fashioned a local law protecting the latter.
Under the facts of Himes, Pennsylvania certainly had a significant in-
terest in the application of its owner-protecting local law. Consequently,
the conclusion of the foregoing analysis is that New York had a signifi-
cant interest in the application of its local law of owner liability, which
is based on conduct regulation, and Pennsylvania had a significant in-
terest in the application of its contrary local law, which is based on
protecting the economic integrity of Pennsylvania domiciled owners.
At this point in the analysis, Professor Weintraub's rules are ap-
plicable. Since each state had a significant interest in the application of
its own local law, the case involved a true conflict. Under rule 2,10 New
York's owner liability law would be applied, provided that it is not
anachronistic or aberrational (I think it is neither) and provided that
New York has sufficient contact with the Pennsylvania owners or their
conduct (I think it does). Upon identifying the reasons underlying each
state's law, and having determined the convertibility of each of those
reasons into a significant interest, Professor Weintraub's rules for a
quick resolution based on his view that plaintiff-favoring laws are the
better laws may be employed.
Under my approach, however, because each state had a significant
interest in the application of its own local law, I would attempt to
determine which state's interest is more significant and apply the local
law of that state. Assume that counsel for the plaintiff offers and the
court receives information indicating that the owners had liability in-
surance applicable to the incident in an amount more than adequate to
cover any judgment for the plaintiff.' That information would
demonstrate that applying New York's owner liability law would, in
fact, do little to frustrate Pennsylvania's interest in protecting the
economic integrity of the Pennsylvania owners. Given a judgment for
the plaintiff and against all the defendants, the liability insurance car-
rier would pick up the entire tab. The owners would not be required to
100. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
101. In fact, the owners' liability insurance policy limit was $50,000. The plaintiff's
cause of action had a potential dollar value far in excess of the policy limit. Following the
decision by the Supreme Court of Cattaraugus County, the case was settled at the policy
limit. I was advised of this during a telephone conversation with Joseph C. Dwyer, Esq.,
counsel for the plaintiff, on Sept. 10, 1980. I wish to express my gratitude to Attorney
Dwyer for providing me with that information and for permitting me to include it herein.
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pay anything out of pocket. The incoilvenience of being defendants in a
lawsuit would also tend to serve New York's interest in inhibiting car
owners from carelessly lending their vehicles for use in New York.
This more specific information would seem to motivate the court
towards finding New York's interest more significant and applying its
owner.liability law.
But a judgment for the plaintiff against all the defendants might
render it more expensive or just more difficult for owners to secure
future liability insurance coverage. The same result, however, would
occur even were Pennsylvania's law avoiding owner liability to be ap-
plied. If the defendant driver was driving with the consent of the
owners, their liability insurance would be applicable to the collision
whether or not the owners were party-defendants. Any judgment en-
joyed by the plaintiff against the defendant driver would be paid by
the owners' carrier. It would then be likely that the owners would find
it just as expensive or difficult to secure future liability insurance as
they might have had they also been defendants. Consequently, given
liability insurance coverage in an amount more than adequate to cover
any judgment secured by the plaintiff, the court probably would con-
clude that application of New York's owner liability law would do little
to frustrate Pennsylvania's interest in the economic integrity of the
owners while serving New York's interest in regulating the conduct of
owners.
Next, assume that counsel does not offer and the court does not re-
quest such insurance information. Absent that enhanced degree of
specificity, how should the court go about determining which state's in-
terest is more significant? If the court applies New York's owner
liability law, Pennsylvania's interest in protecting the economic in-
tegrity of its domiciled owners will be frustrated. If the court applies
Pennsylvania's owner-protecting law, New York's interest in
regulating owners' conduct will be frustrated. Which state's interest
should be considered more intense?
Although it is true that application of New York's owner liability
law would directly frustrate Pennsylvania's interest in protecting the
economic integrity of the Pennsylvania owners, I find that frustration
less acute than the frustration of New York's interest in conduct
regulation which the application of Pennsylvania's law would produce.
The Pennsylvania owners, even if subjected to liability, would retain
an undiminished physical and emotional capacity to survive. They were
not the personal injury victims of the collision. Admittedly, subjecting
them to a judgment for the plaintiff could diminish substantially or
even deplete their existing assets. I do not intend to minimize the
significance of such an economic impact. I do, however, wish to dis-
tinguish that purely economic impact from the more severe impact
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resulting from serious personal injuries and mental anguish. The latter
impairments will also surely generate their own grave economic conse-
quences. The personal injury victim is unlikely to retain her original
capacity to be self-sustaining and, in addition, will be required to live
with the continuing pain and anguish caused by the personal injuries
suffered from the collision. New York's interest in conduct regulation
is aimed at preventing the collision and avoiding the plight of the im-
mediate victim of the collision."2 That interest, I believe, is even more
intense than Pennsylvania's contrary yet wholly legitimate interest in
protecting the economic integrity of the vehicle owners. Consequently,
I believe the court should apply New York's law.
Suppose, however, that the court is inclined to conclude otherwise. I
think a contrary conclusion could not be deemed irrational or patently
incorrect. Because it would derive from a reasoning process, a decision
to apply Pennsylvania local law would be intellectually acceptable if
not personally preferable. Professor Weintraub's rule 2 would not meet
the test of reason. The blanket imposition of the plaintiff-favoring rule
on the court cannot, in my opinion, be justified. Despite the factual ac-
curacy of the general assertion that "recovery, with loss-distribution
through the tortfeasor's liability insurance, represents the most per-
vasive aspect of tort development in this country over the past several
decades," its unexamined application lacks reasoned analysis. My point
is that the emphasis on "the tortfeasor's liability insurance" should be
dealt with directly and factually. The existence and amount of the
defendant's liability insurance should be considered relevant informa-
tion when offered by counsel or requested by the court. Moreover, I
submit that such information and all other information relevant to the
choice-of-law issue"0 3 should regularly be submitted to the court for the
102. See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
103. In Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973),
the Second Circuit was required to determine the applicability of Massachusetts' then ex-
isting ceiling on wrongful death actions to an action arising out of the death of a New
York domiciliary in Massachusetts. The plaintiff, decedent's widow, was a New York
domiciliary and the defendants were a Massachusetts surgeon and hospital. In this diver-
sity case, the Second Circuit concluded that the New York Court of Appeals would not ap-
ply the Massachusetts ceiling. Counsel on both sides apparently provided the court with
an enhanced degree of specificity: "[Decedent] was examined and diagnosed by [defendant]
Dr. Warren, whom the plaintiff describes as a world-renowned physician and surgeon
treating patients from all over the world." Id. at 439. Presumably, this characterization of
the defendant physician was offered by the plaintiffs counsel in order to persuade the
court that the physician could not reasonably anticipate the application of the
Massachusetts ceiling with regard to all his patients.
The court further stated with regard to the non-local nature of the hospital that:
It is undisputed that although the [defendant] hospital is a Massachusetts cor-
poration, approximately one-third of its patients in 1969 came from outside
Massachusetts and approximately 8 per cent of its patients in the same year were
from New York. Indeed, the hospital claimed in its 1969 annual report that it was
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purpose of affording the court an enhanced degree of specificity. '
Ultimately, therefore, I regard Professor Weintraub's rules di-
versely. I would concur entirely in rule 1, applicable to false conflict
cases."5 Should only one of the states have a significant interest in the
application of its local law, that local law is to be applied. The second
state's minimal interest in the litigation has significance only to the ex-
tent that that minimal interest is best served by application of the
first state's law, and then only for the purpose of confirming the
court's decision to apply the first state's law.
Its minimal interest in the litigation, best served by the first state's
law, demonstrates the false conflict and the complete propriety of the
court's application of the local law of the first state. A spurious con-
flict, on the other hand, would be created if the court weighed the se-
cond state's minimal interest in the litigation against the first state's
significant interest in the application of its own local law. By definition,
a minimal interest in the litigation is inferior to a state's significant in-
terest in the application of its local law; had the reason underlying the
second state's local law been convertible into a significant interest, the
frustration of the minimal interest would have been an implicit and ac-
ceptable consequence.
I would dissent from Professor Weintraub's rules 2 and 3. In true
conflict cases (rule 2),116 the court should arrive at a reasoned conclu-
"not a local or community hospital in the usual sense because its patients came
from literally everywhere."
Id at 440.
Similarly, this information about the defendant hospital was offered by the plaintiff's
counsel in order to persuade the court that the hospital could not reasonably anticipate
the application of the Massachusetts ceiling with regard to all its patients.
The court further noted the different premium limits for surgeons in New York and
Massachusetts:
An affidavit of the head of the casualty underwriting department of the Boston of-
fice of St. Paul Fire & Marine, which issued the liability policy under which defend-
ant Warren was covered, indicates that a general surgeon's liability policy in
Massachusetts has a basic limit premium of $192, while a New York City surgeon
pays a basic limit premium of $1,139, and that one factor contributing to the dif-
ference is the "dollar exposure" in New York, which has no wrongful death limita-
tion.
Id
This economic information presumably was offered by defense counsel in an effort to em-
phasize Massachusetts' interest in assuring the availability of medical care in that state
and, perhaps, the liability carrier's reliance on the Massachusetts ceiling. The effort was
not entirely successful, however, for the court replied, "Dr. Warren's policy, however,
makes no reference to coverage limitation in wrongful death cases." Id
104. Naturally, judicial consideration of such information must be constitutionally per-
missible as well as unlikely to generate an adverse policy effect; see notes 69-73 and ac-
companying text supra.
105. See text accompanying notes 3-15 supra.
106. See text accompanying notes 80-88 supra
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sion as to which state's interest in the application of its local law is
more significant and apply the local law of that state. The court will be
greatly assisted in its deliberations if it can receive from counsel addi-
tional information relevant to the choice-of-law issue presented, pro-
vided that consideration of such information is constitutionally per-
missible and not likely to generate adverse future consequences.1 7 In a
number of true conflict cases, that additional information is likely to
facilitate judicial resolution of even the difficult choice-of-law issues.
Where necessary, the court should examine the conflicts laws of the
competing states for the purpose of securing additional insight into the
significance which each state's own courts would attach to its interest.
With regard to rule 3,18 1 take exception to the characterization of "no
interest" cases; if neither state has a significant interest in the applica-
tion of its own local law, the court should determine each state's
minimal interest in the litigation. Where neither state has a significant
interest in the application of its own local law, consideration of each
state's minimal interest in the litigation will generate no spurious con-
flict, either internally or between the two states. If those minimal in-
terests are in conflict, the court should arrive at a reasoned conclusion
as to which state's minimal interest is more significant and apply the
local law which serves that interest. In arriving at that conclusion, the
court should utilize the techniques suggested for true conflict cases,
since competing minimal interests in the litigation generate a true con-
flict.
In this manner, the courts are likely to produce results worthy of
general approbation without the imposition of a rigid and extrinsic con-
clusion that plaintiff-favoring laws are better. Furthermore, these
courts would avoid the inadvertent conversion of cases involving com-
peting minimal interests in the litigation into "no interest" cases. In
short, I cannot offer a magic rule which will make interest analysis
easy no matter how difficult the choice-of-law issue may be. The quest
for perfection, especially in the form of easily applied rules, although
understandable and even commendable, is unlikely ever to be achieved.
Man, after all, is fallible and his rules cannot anticipate all the varied
factual combinations which are possible. Instead, I have confidence
that interest analysis courts utilizing all of the appropriate and rele-
vant information and recognizing the orders of interests which may ex-
ist in a particular case possess the capacity to produce excellent
results without recourse to an extrinsic view as to the generally better
rule of law.
107. See notes 69-73 and accompanying text supra.
108. See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra.
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